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Abstract
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution with a finite number of decoy states
is analyzed under finite-data-size assumption. By accounting for statistical fluctuations in param-
eter estimation, we investigate vacuum+weak- and vacuum+two-weak-decoy-state protocols. In
each case, we find proper operation regimes, where the performance of our system is comparable
to the asymptotic case for which the key size and the number of decoy states approach infinity.
Our results show that practical implementations of this scheme can be both secure and efficient.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] is one of the most successful applications of
quantum information processing, which allows two distant parties, Alice and Bob, to grow
secret keys with information-theoretic security [3–8]. Conventional security proofs of QKD
assume certain physical models for the employed devices — source and detection units. For
instance, the squashing model is widely assumed for the measurement [9–11] in a standard
security analysis [12]. Practical implementations, however, could fall short of meeting all
requirements set by the models, hence security could be compromised in reality. In fact,
side channels have been identified and exploited to break QKD security. These side-channel
attacks include the fake-state attack [13, 14], the time-shift attack [15, 16], the phase-
remapping attack [17, 18], and the detector-blinding attack [19, 20].
Several approaches have been proposed to counter the side-channel attacks. One way is
to sufficiently characterize the behavior of the devices and analyze the security by taking
into account all device parameters [21–23]. This, however, can be difficult to implement in
practice. A second approach that can defeat all side-channel attacks is device-independent
QKD [24–26], in which the security can be proven without knowing the specifications of the
devices used. Security, in this case, is derived from nonlocal correlations by violating Bell’s
inequality [27, 28]. In order to avoid the detection efficiency loophole [29], however, a large
fraction of the transmitted signals must be detected by the receiver, resulting in impractical
requirements for the transmission efficiency (e.g., 82.8% [30] for the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-
Holt (CHSH) inequality [28]).
Instead of full device independence, a detection-device independent QKD scheme is pro-
posed [31, 32], in which the detection system is assumed to be untrusted. Since most of
practical hacking strategies focus on the detection site, and the source site is relatively
simple for characterization, such a scheme can close most loopholes in a QKD system. Un-
fortunately, these schemes still need stringent requirements on the transmission efficiency of
more than 50% [31].
Recently, Lo, Curty, and Qi [33] proposed efficient schemes that are measurement-device
independent (MDI). Alice and Bob send some signals to a willing participant who can even
be an eavesdropper, Eve. Eve performs a Bell-state measurement (BSM) and announces the
result to Alice and Bob who will use this information to distill a secret key. The security is
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based on the idea of entanglement swapping using a BSM and the reverse EPR QKD scheme
[34–36]. The scheme is secure even if Eve intentionally makes the wrong measurement and/or
announces the wrong information. Various implementation approaches to MDI-QKD have
also been proposed [37, 38], and significant efforts have been devoted to its experimental
demonstration [33, 39, 40]. Recently, the first MDI-QKD experiment with decoy states is
completed by Liu et al. [41].
MDI-QKD is not completely device independent and the source devices have to be trusted
and sufficiently characterized. When we use a coherent source to implement a single-photon-
based MDI-QKD scheme, such as that in Ref. [33], we need to estimate the single-photon
contributions of the detection at the receiver, which can be done efficiently using decoy states
[42–45]. In [33], a security analysis is provided for the decoy-state MDI-QKD assuming
infinitely long keys with infinitely many decoy states. In this paper, we proceed further and
analyze the performance of decoy-state MDI-QKD when only a finite number of decoy states
are used. Moreover, we consider statistical fluctuations caused by a finite-size key. Such an
analysis is crucial to ensure the security of MDI-QKD in practical setups.
We note that the effect of finite size on MDI-QKD has also been recently studied in
an independent work by Song et al. [46]. However, they only analyzed the vacuum+weak-
decoy-state protocol whereas we also analyze the vacuum+two-weak-decoy-state protocol
here taking advantage of our general method which can easily be adapted to other decoy-
state protocols.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we briefly review the MDI-
QKD scheme with decoy states. In Sec. III, we investigate the QKD model for the security
proof and simulation. In Sec. IV, we perform a statistical fluctuation analysis on MDI-QKD
systems, followed by numerical results in Sec. V. We conclude the paper in Sec. VI with
remarks.
II. DECOY-STATE MDI-QKD
The most general encoding scheme for BB84-based QKD relies on using two optical
orthogonal modes. Here, we encode a qubit in the z basis by using two spatially separated
modes, r and s, as shown in Fig. 1. That is, for the z basis, the information is encoded in
whether the photon is in mode r or s. The qubit can also be encoded into the relative phases
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between modes r and s. Denote x basis to be the case when two relative phases {0, pi} are
used and y basis for {pi/2, 3pi/2}. This encoding is sufficiently general to be tailored down
to all proposed MDI-QKD schemes. For example, in the original MDI-QKD [33], r and s
correspond to H and V polarizations. For BB84 encoding, the z and x basis is used [33]. We
remark that this setup can be used to implement the six-state QKD protocol as well [47].
For practical purposes, one may consider using temporal, rather than the spatial, modes as
proposed in [38, 39]. Here, however, we are mostly concerned with statistical fluctuation
effects due to the finite size of the key, and our results are independent of the employed setup.
The key assumption in all MDI-QKD schemes is that the photons on which the intermediary
BSM is performed are indistinguishable. We assume this condition is held throughout our
analysis.
In this paper, we assume that Alice and Bob use coherent states as their sources and use
the z and x basis above for encoding. The MDI-QKD scheme runs as follows.
1. Alice randomly chooses a basis from {x, z} and a bit from {0, 1}, and sends a coherent-
state pulse with intensity randomly chosen from a predetermined set. As shown in
Fig. 1, if she picks the z basis, she prepares her coherent states with either H or
V polarizations depending on the bit value. Otherwise, if she picks the x basis, she
prepares +45-polarized signals, splits the pulse into two modes, r and s, through a
polarizing beam splitter (PBS), and encodes the bit values into relative phases, {0, pi},
between the two modes. Bob applies the same encoding procedure.
2. Alice and Bob send the pulses to the relay, which can be fully controlled by Eve. Eve
performs a partial BSM on the received pulses, as shown in Fig. 1. Eve announces her
detection results. She is allowed to be dishonest.
3. Alice and Bob compare the bases used for all transmissions which include the no-
detection events, successful BSM events, and unsuccessful BSM events.
4. Based on Eve’s announcement for each pulse, Alice and Bob keep the bit if it cor-
responds to a successful BSM event and a compatible basis has been used. One of
them also flips the bit value in the case of an anticorrelated BSM result (see Fig. 1).
They discard all other bits corresponding to the no-detection events, unsuccessful BSM
events, and those with incompatible bases.
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FIG. 1. (Color Online) A schematic diagram for the MDI-QKD protocol, where PBS stands for
polarizing beam splitter and PM stands for phase modulator. In order to encode their bits in the z
basis, Alice and Bob generate phase-randomized coherent states with either H or V polarizations
at their sources. To encode a bit in the x or y basis, they generate +45-polarized signals at their
encoders. A PM will introduce a relative phase shift between their reference and signal beams.
The phase shifts are chosen from the set {0, pi} for the x basis and {pi/2, 3pi/2} for the y basis.
A partial BSM, possibly performed by an untrusted party, Eve or Charlie, on the two reference
and the two signal modes would establish correlations between the raw key bits of Alice and Bob.
If they both use the z basis, a click on exactly one of the r detectors and exactly one of the s
detectors would imply anti-correlated bits shared between Alice and Bob. For x and y bases, if
they both use the same basis, a joint click on detectors r0 and s0 implies identical bits for Alice
and Bob; so does a joint click on r1 and s1. A joint click on r0 and s1, or, r1 and s0 would imply
anticorrelated bits [38].
5. For each combination of Alice’s intensity µ, Bob’s intensity ν, and basis w = x, z, they
test the error rate Ewµν of the retained bits, and compute the gain Q
w
µν by counting the
number of successful BSM events among all transmissions (including the no-detection
events, successful BSM events, and unsuccessful BSM events) when Alice and Bob
used compatible bases. Thus, it is necessary for Alice and Bob to compare their bases
even for bits that have not resulted in a successful BSM and are to be discarded.
6. Alice and Bob estimate the yield Y z11 and the phase error rate e
x
11 for the fraction of
signals in which Alice has a single photon and Bob has a single photon, based on
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the analysis in Sec. IV. With this parameter estimation, Alice and Bob perform error
correction and privacy amplification to distill a final secret key.
The analysis in the last step is the main focus of this work.
III. MODEL
The notations and definitions used in the model are listed below.
• Alice and Bob each use coherent states to implement decoy-state MDI-QKD. In addi-
tion to the signal state, different intensities will be used for a number of decoy states.
In this section, we denote the mean number of photons in a certain pulse sent by
Alice and Bob, respectively, by µ and ν. In subsequent sections, we introduce a more
detailed notation as needed for decoy states.
• We use the term “i-photon channel” when a Fock state with i photons is used as
information carrier. We denote the joint channel when Alice uses an i-photon channel
and Bob uses a j-photon channel by i⊎j channel, where i, j = 0, 1, 2, . . . . When there
is no ambiguity, we use µ ⊎ ν channel to represent the case when Alice and Bob send
out coherent states with intensities µ and ν, respectively.
• The overall gain Qwµν is defined as the probability of obtaining a successful partial
BSM when Alice and Bob use the µ⊎ ν channel and the w basis, where w = x, z. The
quantum bit error rate (QBER) Ewµν is the corresponding error probability.
• The yield Y wij is the probability to obtain a successful BSM when Alice and Bob use
the i ⊎ j channel and the w basis, where w = x, z, and ewij is the corresponding error
probability. The gain Qwij is defined as the probability that Alice and Bob use the i⊎ j
channel and obtain a successful partial BSM.
• Denote the transmittance of the channel between Alice (Bob) and the relay to be ηa
(ηb). Denote the dark count of each detector by pd.
• We assume the phase modulator (PM) and PBS devices at Alice and Bob are perfect.
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A. Photon-number channel model
When the phases of the coherent states used by Alice and Bob are randomized, the
quantum channel can be modeled as a photon-number channel model [43]. That is, Alice
and Bob randomly choose quantum channels (with a Poisson distribution) with different
Fock states. Thus, the gain and QBER is composed of all the possible i ⊎ j-channels,
Qwµν =
∑
i,j
µiνj
i!j!
e−µ−νY wij ,
EwµνQ
w
µν =
∑
i,j
µiνj
i!j!
e−µ−νewijY
w
ij ,
(1)
where w = x, z.
In the security proof, we assume that Eve has a full control of Y wij and e
w
ij ranging from 0
to 1. The purpose of using decoy states is to estimate Y wij and e
w
ij, with a particular interest
in Y w11 and e
w
11 as only the 1 ⊎ 1 channel contributes to the secret key bits. The gain and
QBER, Qwµν and E
w
µν , on the other hand, are observables for Alice and Bob and are used for
the above estimation.
B. Asymptotic case
In this section, we present the expected values for the parameters of interest if an infinitely
long key is used. These analytical results can be obtained if we assume that the system is
operating under normal conditions. We emphasize that the results of this simulation model
can only be used for simulation purposes, but not for the security proof. For the post-
measurement processing of a real QKD experiment, the key rate and the actual key are
derived from the measurement outcomes, which also include possible Eve’s intervention.
Here, we directly take the results from the Appendixes of Ref. [38]. The observables we
need to use for the simulation are the following gains and QBERs:
Qxµν = 2y
2[1 + 2y2 − 4yI0(x) + I0(2x)],
ExµνQ
x
µν = e0Q
x
µν − 2(e0 − ed)y2[I0(2x)− 1],
(2)
and
Qzµν = QC +QE ,
EzµνQ
z
µν = edQC + (1− ed)QE, (3)
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where
QC = 2(1− pd)2e−µ′/2
[
1− (1− pd)e−ηaµ/2
] [
1− (1− pd)e−ηbν/2
]
,
QE = 2pd(1− pd)2e−µ′/2[I0(2x)− (1− pd)e−µ′/2]. (4)
In the above equations, I0(x) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind, ed represents
the misalignment-error probability, e0 = 1/2, and
x =
√
ηaµηbν/2,
y = (1− pd)e−µ′/4,
µ′ = ηaµ+ ηbν.
(5)
We also need the gain of single-photon states, Qw11, w = x, z, given by
Qw11 = µνe
−µ−νY w11. (6)
Without Eve’s intervention, the yield and error rate of the 1 ⊎ 1 channel are given by
Y x11 = Y
z
11 = (1− pd)2
[ηaηb
2
+ (2ηa + 2ηb − 3ηaηb)pd + 4(1− ηa)(1− ηb)p2d
]
,
ex11Y
x
11 = e0Y
x
11 − (e0 − ed)(1− pd)2
ηaηb
2
,
ez11Y
z
11 = e0Y
z
11 − (e0 − ed)(1− pd)2(1− 2pd)
ηaηb
2
,
(7)
which will be used for the simulation of the asymptotic case.
IV. POST PROCESSING
A. Key rate
The key rate is given by [33, 43],
R ≥ Qz11[1−H(ex11)]− Iec,
Iec = Q
z
µνfH(E
z
µν),
(8)
where Iec is the cost of error correction, f is the error correction efficiency, and H(e) =
−e log2(e)− (1− e) log2(1− e) is the binary Shannon entropy function. We assume that the
final key is extracted from the data measured in the z basis. Note that, for single-photon
states, the phase error probability in the z basis is the bit error probability in the x basis,
ex11, since single photons form a basis-independent source [48].
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B. Parameter estimation
The post-measurement processing of MDI-QKD includes the two conventional stages of
error correction and privacy amplification. Error correction only depends on the directly
observable error rate, Ezµν . Thus, the term Iec, in the key rate formula of Eq. (8), is fixed.
For privacy amplification, one needs to estimate the parameters of the 1 ⊎ 1-channel, Qz11
and ex11, with decoy states. Thus, the key point of the parameter estimation in this stage
is to estimate the privacy amplification term, i.e., the first term on the right-hand side of
Eq. (8).
Assume that Alice usesma phase-randomized coherent states with intensities µ0, µ1, . . . , µma−1,
representing one signal andma−1 decoy states, and Bob usesmb intensities ν0, ν1, . . . , νmb−1.
Our objective is to solve the following [49]:
min
Y wij ,e
w
ij
Y z11[1−H(ex11)], (9)
subject to
Qwµkνl =
∑
i,j
µikν
j
l
i!j!
e−µk−νlY wij ,
EwµkνlQ
w
µkνl
=
∑
i,j
µikν
j
l
i!j!
e−µk−νlewijY
w
ij ,
(10)
for k = 0, 1, . . . , ma− 1, l = 0, 1, . . . , mb− 1 and w = x, z. The number of linear constraints
in Y wij and e
w
ijY
w
ij is 4mamb.
In order to find the minimum in Eq. (9), we lower bound Y z11 and upper bound e
x
11
separately [50]. Both these problems can be solved using linear programming, and that will
provide us with a lower bound on the optimal value that one can find by directly solving
the nonlinear minimization problem in Eq. (9). Note that, even in our simplified approach,
one must deal with an infinite number of unknowns in Y wij and e
w
ij , i, j = 0, 1, 2, . . . . In our
numerical analysis, we take an additional simplifying step and drop terms of higher orders
in Eq. (10). Because of the Poisson-distributed coefficients of Y wij and e
w
ij , in Eq. (10), these
terms decrease exponentially by increasing i and j. From our numerical simulations, we find
that the effect of terms with i, j ≥ 7 on the parameter estimation is negligible. To further
verify this analytically, note that the sum of the dropped terms of i, j ≥ k in Eq. (10) is
upper bounded by τ(µ, k) := 1 − (∑k−1i=0 µ
i
i!
e−µ)2 when considering Y wij = 1 and assuming
that µ = µk = µl. Fig. 2 shows τ(µ, k) for three nominal values of µ and k = 6, . . . , 11. It
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turns out that the neglected terms have insignificant impact on the values of Y w11 and e
w
11Y
w
11
that we obtain in our simulations in Sec. V; see Tables IV and V.
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FIG. 2. (Color Online) Upper bounds on the dropped terms in Eq. (10). It can be seen that the
effect of dropping higher order terms is negligible when the number of leading terms kept, k, is not
too small.
We follow the statistical fluctuation analysis proposed in Ref. [44]. Then, the equalities
in Eq. (10) becomes inequalities,
Qˆwµkνl(1− βq) ≤
∑
i,j
µikν
j
l
i!j!
e−µk−νlY wij ≤ Qˆwµkνl(1 + βq)
EˆwµkνlQˆ
w
µkνl
(1− βeq) ≤
∑
i,j
µikν
j
l
i!j!
e−µk−νlewijY
w
ij ≤ EˆwµkνlQˆwµkνl(1 + βeq),
(11)
where if the left hand side of the inequality is negative, we replace it with 0. The variables,
Qˆwµkνl and Eˆ
w
µkνl
are measurement outcomes. That is, they are rates instead of probabilities.
The fluctuation ratio βq and βeq can be evaluated by
βq =
nα√
NwµkνlQˆ
w
µkνl
,
βeq =
nα√
NwµkνlEˆ
w
µkνl
Qˆwµkνl
,
(12)
where Nwµkνl is the number of pulses, in the w basis, sent out by Alice and Bob when they use
intensities µk and νl, respectively; nα is the number of standard deviations one chooses for
statistical fluctuation analysis. In other words, NwµkνlQˆ
w
µkνl
is the number of successful partial
BSMs when Alice and Bob use intensities µk and νl, respectively, and N
w
µkνl
EˆwµkνlQˆ
w
µkνl
is the
corresponding error count. If we follow the Gaussian assumption made in [44], the number
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of standard deviations, nα, will be directly related to the failure probability of this security
analysis. For example, when nα = 5, as used later, it will introduce a failure probability of
5.73× 10−7.
V. SIMULATION
For simplicity, we assume that Alice and Bob send the same number of pulses for all µ⊎ν
channels, denoted by Ndata. In the following simulations, the parameters of the experimental
setup are listed in Table I.
ed pd f Ndata
1.5% 3× 10−6 1.16 2× 1010
TABLE I. List of experimental parameters used in numerical results: ed is the misalignment
probability; pd is the background count rate per detector; f is the error correction inefficiency;
Ndata is the number of pulses sent by Alice and Bob for each pair of intensities.
In the simulation, we absorb the detection loss into channel losses. Note that with the
current development in high-speed QKD systems [51–53], Ndata = 2 × 1010 pulses can be
transmitted in seconds. We assume that Alice and Bob pick nα standard deviations for the
statistical fluctuation analysis, which is determined by the allowable failure probability for
the system.
A. Vacuum+weak-decoy-state protocol
We consider that Alice and Bob run the vacuum+weak-decoy-state protocol [44] and they
choose the same intensities for the coherent states. Let us assume a typical set of intensities:
{0, 0.1, 0.5}. Note that we assume Ndata = 2× 1010 for each µ ⊎ ν channel. Thus, the total
number of pulses sent by Alice and Bob is 18× 1010.
For each of the nine µ⊎ν channels, Alice and Bob can obtain a set of linear inequalities, in
the form of Eq. (11), for gains and QBERs. As noted before, we neglect terms with i, j ≥ 7,
and find the lower bound on Y z11 and the upper bound on e
x
11 using linear programming.
In order to obtain a sense of the magnitude of the parameter values, we calculate the
gains and QBERs, at ηa = ηb = 0.1, using Eqs. (2) and (3) for the x and z basis. The gain
11
values are listed in Table II. The QBER of the case when either party chooses the vacuum
z-basis x-basis
Bob/Alice µ = 0 µ = 0.1 µ = 0.5 µ = 0 µ = 0.1 µ = 0.5
ν = 0 3.6000 × 10−11 5.9587 × 10−8 2.8900 × 10−7 3.5999 × 10−11 2.4873 × 10−5 6.0229 × 10−4
ν = 0.1 5.9587 × 10−8 4.9374 × 10−5 2.3935 × 10−4 2.4873 × 10−5 9.8876 × 10−5 8.6437 × 10−4
ν = 0.5 2.8900 × 10−7 2.3935 × 10−4 1.1603 × 10−3 6.0229 × 10−4 8.6437 × 10−4 2.3495 × 10−3
TABLE II. Simulation values of the gain, Qwµν , w = x, z, for the vacuum+weak-decoy-state protocol,
evaluated using Eqs. (2) and (3). It is assumed that ηa = ηb = 0.1.
decoy state is 1/2 and that of the remaining four nontrivial cases is shown in Table III, for
the x and z basis. Note that the QBER in the z basis is reasonably close to ed as expected
from Eqs. (3) and (7). The QBER in the x basis, on the other hand, is larger than 25%,
which is mainly caused by false triggering of multiphoton states [33, 38]. This is the key
reason why the final key in Eq. (8) should be only extracted from the z basis.
z-basis x-basis
Bob/Alice µ = 0.1 µ = 0.5 µ = 0.1 µ = 0.5
ν = 0.1 1.6164% 1.5700% 25.7184% 36.3867%
ν = 0.5 1.5700% 1.5236% 36.3867% 25.4516%
TABLE III. Simulation values of QBER, Ewµν , w = x, z, for different intensity values evaluated
from Eqs. (2) and (3).
In practice, Qˆwµν and Eˆ
w
µν , similar to those in Tables II and III, are derived from the raw
data obtained in the experiment. The task of the security analysis, which is the main focus
of this work, is to determine the final secure key rate for such sets of data. Following the
analysis given in Sec. IVB, here we minimize Y z11 and maximize e
x
11 subject to constraints
of Eq. (11), by assuming that the values listed in Tables II and III are, respectively, the
measured gain and QBER in a certain experiment.
Table IV provides lower and upper bounds on these parameters, obtained by solving the
corresponding linear-programming problems, and compared them with the expected values
from the simulation results of Eq. (7). From Table IV, one can see that the parameter
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estimations in the x basis is worse than those in the z basis. This is because multiphoton
terms contribute more to the gains and QBERs in the x basis than in the z basis.
w = z w = x
Parameters Asymptotic value Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound
Y w11 5.0011 × 10−3 4.6043 × 10−3 6.0286 × 10−3 4.1343 × 10−3 6.6334 × 10−3
ew11 1.5108% 0.9556% 2.1341% 0 10.2126%
TABLE IV. Lower and upper bounds on Y w11 and e
w
11 in both bases, compared to asymptotic values.
In our statistical fluctuation analysis, five standard deviations are taken into consideration.
Substituting the parameter estimations from Table IV, the lower bound of Y z11 and the
upper bound of ex11, into Eq. (8), one can calculate the key rate to be 6.89×10−5 bits/pulse.
Similarly, one can evaluate the dependence of the key rate on channel transmittance, as
shown in Fig. 3. One can see that even by including statistical fluctuations the key rate
decreases linearly with channel loss before the cut-off regime. In the low-loss regime, the
vacuum+weak-decoy-state protocol performs almost as well as the asymptotic case.
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FIG. 3. Key rate versus channel transmittance using vacuum+weak decoy-state method for MDI-
QKD.
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As shown in Fig. 3, with nα = 5 standard deviations, the maximum tolerable transmission
loss is almost 30 dB less than that of the asymptotic case. Even if we do not take the
statistical fluctuations (nα = 0) into account, there is still a gap between the two cases.
Thus, there is big room for further improvement. In the next simulation, we will consider
three decoy states and show that further improvements can be made when more decoy states
are applied.
B. Vacuum+two-weak-decoy-state protocol
In order to give a better estimation of Y z11 and e
x
11, one can use more than two decoy
states. Let us assume that Alice and Bob use four coherent states {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5} and that
we use Ndata = 2 × 1010 for each µ ⊎ ν channel. Thus, the total number of pulses sent by
Alice and Bob is 32 × 1010, corresponding to 16 channels. Given that by adding an extra
decoy state on each side we can better estimate channel parameters, the key rate is expected
to be no less than the one in Sec. VA.
Similar to the previous section, we take ηa = ηb = 0.1 as an example to see how accurate
the parameter estimation is. The bounds of Y z11 and e
x
11 in both bases, compared to the
asymptotic case, are listed in Table V. Again, the parameter estimations in the x basis is
worse than those in the z basis, due to the multiphoton terms.
w = z w = x
Parameters Asymptotic value Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound
Y w11 5.0011 × 10−3 4.7058 × 10−3 5.2377 × 10−3 4.3734 × 10−3 5.5640 × 10−3
ew11 1.5108% 1.1103% 2.0409% 0 7.7954%
TABLE V. Lower and upper bounds on Y w11 and e
w
11 in both bases, compared to asymptotic values.
In our statistical fluctuation analysis, five standard deviations are taken into consideration.
Similar to the vacuum+weak-decoy-state case, one can calculate the key rate to be 1.09×
10−4 bits/pulse by substituting the parameter estimations from Table V, the lower bound
of Y z11 and the upper bound of e
x
11, into Eq. (8). According to Table V, our parameter
estimation has improved when more decoy states (in extra pulses) are applied, as compared
to the previous case in Table IV.
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FIG. 4. Key rate versus channel transmittance using vacuum+two-weak-decoy-state method for
MDI-QKD.
The dependence of the key rate on the channel transmittance is shown in Fig. 4. One
can see that the gap between the finite-size case and the asymptotic case is smaller than the
one shown in Fig. 3. In the case of nα = 0, the vacuum+two-weak-decoy-state protocol is
very close to the asymptotic case. This is different from regular decoy-state protocol, where
two decoy states are proven to be sufficient for practical usage [44].
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We showed that MDI-QKD is a highly practical scheme even when the statistical fluctu-
ations are accounted for. In the low-loss regime, with only two or three decoy states, the
performance of MDI-QKD with statistical fluctuations is close to that of the asymptotic
case. At higher values of loss, using three decoy states would be recommended. We remark
that our analysis is quite general and is applicable to different MDI-QKD implementations
such as those based on phase encoding and/or polarization encoding as well as those those
based on the BB84 protocol or the six-state protocol.
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